De La Espriella’s Security and Defense Policy Requires Plan Lazo 2.0 to Avoid Past Mistakes

    Introduction

    National security and defense in Colombia demand pragmatism—devoid of ideological dogmas, yet firmly anchored in the historical reality of the armed conflict. The security policy of the De La Espriella administration, aimed at restoring institutional firmness, demanding decisive operational results from the Military Forces, and restructuring the state security apparatus, seeks to rebuild the Republic’s constitutional order. However, demanding operational results per se carries systemic risks.

    It would be far better to holistically integrate indispensable military force with a Plan Lazo 2.0. The objective is not to resurrect the methods of the 1960s, but to evolve the concept of comprehensive state action (acción integral del Estado), in which the coercive force of the law advances in lockstep with political warfare, psychological operations, community and institutional development, and a solid moral and constitutional fortification.

    Furthermore, restructuring the nation’s governing body for peace and security requires empowering the National Security Advisory under the leadership of an upright, highly qualified career military officer. This body would oversee the surrender and submission of terrorists to justice—rather than extending them prolonged tactical advantages—while anchoring a 40-year state project originated by a doctrinal political party.

    Strategic Nexus: Historical Causes, Past Mistakes, and the Need for Plan Lazo 2.0

    Genesis of Tri-Party Violence and False Solutions

     The endemic, multi-party violence that has plagued Colombia is neither a random phenomenon nor merely a consequence of social marginalization. It is the product of deficient and erratic political stewardship, artificial polarizations engineered by ruling elites intent on perpetuating their hold on power, and the systematic strategy of the Communist Party—which, through its armed wings and its strategy of "combining all forms of struggle," sought for decades to seize power and impose an authoritarian regime through violence and terrorism.

     Confronted with this multifaceted threat, traditional political leaders repeatedly offered the country a playbook of false panaceas: ill-conceived peace processes, rushed constitutional reforms, clientelist power-sharing, and forced political alternations. None of these palliatives delivered a genuine, long-term State Project. Instead of consolidating the rule of law, asymmetric negotiations granted impunity and political legitimacy to criminal structures, allowing them to strategically regroup.

    Between Operational Demands and Doctrinal Transgression

    Proposals centered on "governing with the usual suspects to transform what has always been" stem from a valid premise: without security, there is no development, and crime must be combated with the legitimate force of the State. Operational results are therefore not optional; they are an unrenounceable constitutional duty of the Armed Forces to guarantee sovereignty and protect the citizenry.

    However, the historical experience under the administrations of Álvaro Uribe Vélez and Juan Manuel Santos left bitter lessons that military doctrine cannot ignore. Undue quantitative pressure for "body counts" and immediate results, lacking the necessary backing of comprehensive state action, solid legal intelligence, and strict command ethics, resulted in grave abuses, doctrinal errors, and operational deviations—for which a high price is now being paid before a tribunal custom-made for terrorists.

    These operational abuses cost the military its legitimacy and handed a narrative victory on a silver platter to the FARC and its ideological allies. Through these missteps, subversive structures laundered their public and international image, recasting themselves as victims while pushing for the prosecution of the Public Force. The creation of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the subsequent tarnishing of institutional memory are direct consequences of failing to shield operational effectiveness with strong moral and constitutional fortitude and long-term state planning.

     Toward Plan Lazo 2.0: Comprehensive Action and Political Warfare

     A renewed framework designated as Plan Lazo 2.0 would prevent a repeat of these disastrous outcomes, providing a coherent structure for all operational demands. The original Plan Lazo (1962–1965) recognized that defeating communist subversion could not be achieved on the battlefield alone, but required winning the minds and hearts of the population through coordinated social development.

    Accordingly, the proposed Plan Lazo 2.0 would simultaneously articulate four pillars of action:

    1. Legitimate Coercive Force: High-precision military operations and strategic intelligence, strictly compliant with International Humanitarian Law, yet decisive in neutralizing organized crime and narco-trafficking networks.

    2. Political and Psychological Warfare: The systematic dismantling of disinformation narratives generated by criminal syndicates and narco-terrorist groups, alongside the judicial neutralization of their urban support networks and media influence.

    3. Development and Institutional Presence: The immediate deployment of state capabilities—infrastructure, health, education, justice, and connectivity—following military control, preventing state vacuums from being co-opted once again by terrorists.

    4. Moral and Constitutional Fortification: Continuous training in public ethics, responsible command, and legal integrity for every officer, NCO, agent, and soldier, ensuring that the execution of duty remains impeccable and transparent before the courts.

    Institutional Restructuring: Security and Peace Advisories

     In reviewing the executive branch structure, De La Espriella has proposed eliminating the High Advisory for Peace to replace it with a National Security Advisory. In truth, a National Security Advisory should have existed since the founding of the Republic; today, it is an imperative to structurally defeat narco-terrorism.

To this end, a dedicated technical team should be maintained to coordinate the surrender and submission of narco-terrorists to justice. This team would operate as a specialized branch subordinated to the National Security Advisory, while ministries and the Public Force work in unison to comprehensively pacify the country, and the judiciary acts unsparingly against those who refuse to submit to the Constitution and existing laws.

Real peace is not merely the absence of force; it is the direct result of legal security, state authority, and the consolidation of the Rule of Law.

     Profile of the National Security Advisor

Without exception, this position must be held by a retired career military officer who is upright and proven, possessing:

1. Combat Experience and Territorial Knowledge: A professional officer who has traversed the national territory, understands the real dynamics of conflict on the ground, and does not merely theorize from urban desks.

2. Unquestionable Moral Integrity: An officer free of allegations of illegal acts, without pending investigations or cases before the JEP, and untainted ethically.

3. Statesmanship and Strategic Communication: An individual capable of grasping the full scope of the nation’s challenges, possessing the analytical depth to articulate strategic arguments before Congress, the press, and the international community—regardless of whether they hold the rank of General or Admiral. What matters most is analytical capacity, doctrinal leadership, and geopolitical vision.

    Criteria for Technical Team Selection

    The staff of this National Security Advisory must categorically distance itself from traditional clientelist political practices. Appointments must not be made through favoritism, electoral pay-offs, or political cronyism.

    The nation's security and peace require a cadre of highly qualified experts in strategic intelligence, geopolitics, community development, international law, defense economics, and the negotiation skills needed to secure criminal surrenders that serve the interests of the Colombian people, not those of terrorists.

     Therefore, it is urgent to structure this technical team, define its scope and functions, and formulate a Strategic Plan for Security and Institutional Consolidation projected over an initial four-year horizon and a multi-decade perspective.

      A 40-Year State Project

     For logical reasons, the transformative political leadership Colombia requires in 2026 cannot be confined to a single four-year presidential term. The nation's structural challenges demand a 40-year State Project. To sustain this vision over time, it is imperative to establish a principled, doctrinal political party—structured not as an ephemeral electoral club, but as a permanent institution for training political cadres and government leaders.

     All actions of the National Security Advisory must align with this long-term strategic plan, oriented toward Colombia's comprehensive development, the strengthening of individual liberties, and the preservation of national sovereignty over the interests of particular groups or ruling elites.

      Conclusion

     Demanding decisive operational results in the fight against crime is an inescapable duty to restore order and institutional integrity in Colombia. However, responsible patriotism requires absorbing the lessons of recent history: force devoid of doctrine, structured strategy, and a comprehensive framework encompassing political, psychological, and community engagement leads to institutional disaster and the victimization of the Armed Forces themselves.

     To endure as a visionary solution, the security policy of the De La Espriella administration urgently requires the design and implementation of a Plan Lazo 2.0—one that integrates military action with political warfare, psychological strategy, community development, and the fortification of constitutional values.

     By establishing a National Security Advisory led by a qualified, upright military officer, and embedding these efforts within a 40-year State Project, Colombia can secure lasting peace, true justice, and the long-overdue consolidation of the Republic.

     About the Author:

     Lieutenant Colonel Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido is a veteran officer of the Colombian Army, a renowned international analyst of strategic affairs, geopolitics, and national security. He is the author of more than 40 books on the Colombian  conflict and international terrorism. Additionally, he is an international lecturer and expert consultant on defense and military leadership for the most relevant Spanish-language media outlets in the world.

Keywords / Tags:

#LuisAlbertoVillamarinPulido #SecurityPolicy #PlanLazo2 #SecurityAndDefense #JEP #SecurityAdvisory #PoliticalWarfare #MilitaryForces #NationalStrategy #StateProject