Successes, Failures, and Prospect regarding the Sixth Month of Hostilities between the United States and Iran

    Initial Reflection for the Strategic and Geopolitical Balance of the Conflict

     The outbreak of open military confrontation between the United States and Iran at the end of February 2026 has altered the security architecture in the Middle East and generated shockwaves in the global political economy. Therefore, unlike conventional media approaches, which are plagued by partisan biases or short-term criticisms of the administrations in power, a strictly geopolitical and pragmatic analysis is required. The purpose is to objectively evaluate the systematic failures and relative successes of both contenders, stripping the narrative of propaganda, and thus, establishing the reality of the war to date.

    1. Geopolitical Description and Reality of the War in the Current Context

     Five months into hostilites, the war shows evidence of a complex strategic stalemate. On one hand, there is an assumed, though not accepted by the White House, limitation on the operational reserves of the United States' naval and air forces and advanced interceptor systems, which would have been subjected to an unsustainable rate of attrition against Iran's bold strategy of asymmetric aggressions. However, on the geopolitical balance, Iran absolutely lacks the structural and logistical capacity to sustain a long-term conventional confrontation against the North American superpower.

    Faced with this elemental vulnerability, Tehran deploys an asymmetric strategy of deep attrition, launching ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) in small amounts, which it protects underwater and in intricate ways in its rugged mountainous geography. The configuration of the war scenario emulates a sort of "augmented Gaza" on a regional scale, leveraging topographic complexity to counter the technological superiority of allied aviation.

     The Iranian goal is eminently political, strategic, and diplomatic: it seeks to prevail at the negotiating table and force the enemy's withdrawal regardless of its own human or material cost, reflecting a quasi-suicidal mentality in which the economic survival of the population is subordinate to the ideological resilience of the regime.

    However, this long-term approach will imply prohibitive costs for Iran. Despite the calculations of its strategists in concert with the Eurasian axis, the People's Republic of China will not provide the unrestricted support nor the diplomatic or military lifeline that Tehran assumes. Beijing prioritizes the stability of its international trade flows and will avoid direct involvement in an open confrontation with Washington, limiting itself to providing indirect support or defensive supplies that do not fundamentally alter its global stance.

    2. Comparative Analysis of Military and Regional Factors

       a. Morale of the Forces in Conflict

      The morale of the U.S. troops deployed in the region is experiencing high levels of unique pressure. Although backed by unquestionable technical supremacy, the naval and air defense forces face combat fatigue due to the permanent siege of low-cost weaponry, a situation that generates a psychological and logistical gap. In contrast, the morale of Iran's defense forces and its allied militias is founded on asymmetric indoctrination and an extreme cultural tolerance for casualties, which endows them with a particular resilience to prolong the conflict despite the systematic decapitation of their leadership structures, but the civilian population will gradually grow tired of this drama.

      b. Prolongation Capacity and the Scenario in the Persian Gulf

      Iran's capacity to dilate hostilities is concentrated in the geographical dominion of the Strait of Hormuz. The intermittent and effective blockade of this vital maritime route has caused volatility in global energy markets, raising crude oil prices and eroding the economic certainty of Western allies. This advantage allows Iran to compensate for its strict military inferiority through direct economic blackmail against the regional neighborhood.

      c. Behavior of Saudi Arabia and the Deception Hypothesis

     The stance of the Sunni kingdom of Saudi Arabia appears disconcerting at first glance, showing evidence of a strategic double game. On one hand, it leads Western coalitions in the Red Sea and actively participates in containing and  neutralizing Houthi projection and the actions of Iranian militias in Iraq; on the other hand, it exercises intense diplomacy behind the scenes, urging the White House to moderate energy reprisals on Persian territory for the sake of a diplomatic de-escalation to safeguard its critical infrastructures.

     From an advanced geopolitical reading, this splitting can be interpreted under two theses: a genuine fear of internal devastation from Iranian reprisals, or the coordinated development of a sophisticated strategy of tactical deception, designed to project weakness and detente just before delivering a massive, joint, and definitive blow against Iran's strategic infrastructure.

      d. Regional Projection and Uncertainty in Israel's Stance

    Iran's capacity to extend its attacks towards the periphery has reached previously calm areas such as the Suez Canal and Egyptian ports, through the cooperation of the Houthis and other proxy actors. Meanwhile, the State of Israel maintains an unusual stance of containment.

Despite having provided the initial justifications for the campaign alongside the United States, the Israeli political and defense leadership is restrained by Washington's momentary tactical disapproval, which prevents direct offensives against the Islamic Republic's oil complexes in order to mitigate a global economic catastrophe.

3. Internal Dynamics in the United States: Politics, Arsenal, and Public Opinion

     Given the lack of a unified and forceful stance on the part of Congress, on the U.S. domestic front, the superior conduct of the war in Iran is centralized and subject to the Executive's discretion. The members of the legislative act are paralyzed in the face of the political calculation derived from the primary elections, avoiding real counterweights.

      A key element in the manipulation of public opinion lies in the administration's argument regarding the wear of the defense arsenal. Through an impartial analysis of the technical figures gathered from the operations, it is feasible to contrast the resources employed against the total available inventories:

     Patriot Missiles (air defense): 1,200 consumed from an inventory of 2,330 (51.5% operational wear). Tomahawk Cruise Missiles: Over 1,000 consumed from a total of 3,000 (~33.3% operational wear). Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM): Over 1,100 consumed from a total of 4,440 (~24.8% operational wear). Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM): Between 40 and 70 consumed from a total of 90 (44.4% - 77.8% operational wear). SM-3 Interceptor Missiles: Between 130 and 250 consumed from a total of 410 (31.7% - 61.0% operational wear). SM-6 Multipurpose Missiles: Between 90 and 370 consumed from a total of 1,160 (7.7% - 31.9% operational wear). Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Missiles: Between 190 and 290 consumed from a total of 360 (52.8% - 80.5% operational wear).

     The crossing of data reveals considerable wear on critical allocations such as the THAAD and the Patriot missiles. The official narrative has attempted to blame this depletion on the previous arms transfers destined for Ukraine under the previous administration. However, an objective technical breakdown demonstrates that the aid to Ukraine consisted prevailingly of land combat supplies, for example, armored vehicles, artillery, and 155 mm ammunition, whereas the war against Iran is of a naval-air nature and of high-technology three-dimensional interception.

     This message seeks to sow in U.S. public opinion the perception of an induced limitation to justify the intermittency in the attacks. Likewise, attempts to divert attention through possible interventions in geographically close and politically profitable theaters, like Cuba, could be used to unite the electorate in the face of the November elections.

     Nonetheless, if such a strategic maneuver were to materialize, it would lack relevance to solve the crisis of the oil flows in the Strait of Hormuz or mitigate the volatility of Brent crude oil, whose pre-war base value escalated from 72 to peaks that exceed 100 dollars per barrel.

      4. Strategic and Geopolitical Conclusions

        a. Military-Strategic Conclusion: The massive use of interceptors of extremely high economic cost against drones and missiles through low-cost asymmetric attacks causes an unsustainable financial and logistical asymmetry for the Pentagon in the medium term, forcing constant operational pauses.

        b. Regional Geopolitical Conclusion: The ambiguity of the Gulf actors and Israel's forced paralysis demonstrate that Iran's containment cannot be resolved exclusively through devastating air campaigns, due to the Tehran regime's capacity to project instability over the jugular veins of world maritime trade.

        c. Public Opinion Conclusion: There exists a political and interested handling of the conflict's data on the part of the civilian leadership in Washington, using decontextualized historical comparisons to gloss over an insufficient strategic plan that projects definitive solutions, and in that way, to justify fluctuations of erratic coercive diplomacy.

     5. Prospect of the Conflict

      In light of the preceding balance, the trend of the conflict points towards the intermittent prolongation of hostilities. A definitive de-escalation is unlikely in the short term due to the mutual political dividends that the tension generates for the sustainment of the internal regimes of both sides.

     Given the eventual exhaustion of the selective defense inventories, the United States will be forced to transition from a merely reactive stance to the execution of a large-scale offensive with the support of the entire Sunni neighborhood of the Persian Gulf, aimed at permanently disarticulating the launch capabilities in the Iranian mountainous areas.

   Or in its defect, formalizing a new peace agreement with Iran, under extremely strict conditions for the guaranteed reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, forced by the inviability of China's unlimited support for Iran's total isolationist aims.

      About the Author: Lieutenant Colonel Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido is a veteran officer of the Colombian Army and a renowned international analyst of strategic affairs, geopolitics, and national security. He is the author of more than 40 books on the Colombian conflict and international terrorism. He is also an international speaker and expert consultant on defense and military leadership for the world's most prominent Spanish-language media outlets.

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